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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
David Charles Anderson entered a conditional plea of guilty to possessing a controlled
substance, expressly reserving his right to appeal the district court's order denying his motion to
suppress. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Anderson argues that he was unlawfully seized when,
without reasonable suspicion or other constitutional justification, an officer approached him
while he was sitting in his vehicle, requested his identification, and then retained his driver's
license to run his information through dispatch. He further argues that because the evidence later
discovered was the product of the officer's unlawful conduct, suppression was required under the
exclusionary rule, since no exception to that rule had been argued or found to apply in the district
court below.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the arguments made in the Respondent's Brief,
to demonstrate that: (1) Mr. Anderson was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when the officer requested and then retained his license; and (2) that under the
controlling precedent, the seizure of a citizen requires reasonable suspicion, even when the
citizen is the driver of a parked car.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Anderson's Appellant's Brie£

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Anderson's motion to suppress, where the evidence
discovered was the fruit of the officer's suspicionless, unjustified detention of Mr. Anderson, and
the State failed to establish the applicability of any exception to the exclusionary rule?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Anderson's Motion To Suppress, Where The Evidence
Discovered Was The Fruit Of The Officer's Suspicionless, Unjustified Detention Of
Mr. Anderson, And The State Failed To Establish The Applicability Of Any Exception To The
Exclusionary Rule

A.

Officer Herbig's Conduct Violated Mr. Anderson's Fourth Amendment Rights
Contrary to the State's arguments, and as demonstrated below, Mr. Anderson was

"seized" as a matter of law when Officer Herbig requested his identification and then retained his
license, and the State failed to meet its burden to show that the seizure was justified by
reasonable suspicion or any other constitutional justification.

1.

Taking Mr. Anderson's License Was A "Seizure"

Contrary to the State's argument (see Resp. Br., pp.6-9), Mr. Anderson was "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officer requested his ID and retained his
license.
The State's recites the test for determining if a seizure has occurred as whether, under the
circumstances surrounding the encounter, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or
otherwise decline the officer's request and terminate the encounter. (Respondent's Br., p.6.)
Otherwise stated, "so long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go
about his business, an encounter between police and an individual is consensual." State v. Page,
140 Idaho 841 (2004) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)).

Police may

approach an individual on the street or in a public place and ask to examine identification, "[ s]o

long as police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required. " Id.
However, "when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
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restrained the liberty of a citizen," then "a 'seizure' has occurred." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429,434 (1991) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The State claims, erroneously, that there was no "seizure" here, and asserts that
Mr. Anderson was "free to terminate" the encounter:
The fact that officer Herbig held Anderson's license for 29 seconds while he ran a
warrants check would only be sufficient to transform the contact into a seizure if a
reasonable person would not feel free to "terminate the encounter." Anderson could have
easily asked for his license back; that he did not does not mean he was seized.
(Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)
The State's argument ignores the established law and the facts in this case. By virtue of
Idaho Code § 49-316, 1 Mr. Anderson had a legal duty to surrender his license upon demand of an
officer, and no reasonable persons under the circumstances - i.e., a person seated in the driver's
seat of a vehicle, keys in the ignition, parked in a public parking lot - would believe he was free
to ignore the officer's request for his identification and not produce his driver's license.
Because the same statute required that Mr. Anderson have his license "in his immediate
possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle," he was legally obligated to comply with
the officer's request and could not drive away without violating the law. No reasonable person
under these circumstances would have believed he was "at liberty to ignore the police presence
and go about his business."

Mr. Anderson was required to surrender his license and was

restricted by law from driving away. Therefore, as a matter oflaw, Mr. Anderson was "seized"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officer requested and took his license.
See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 429.
1

Idaho Code§ 49-316 provides, in relevant part:
Every licensee shall have his driver's license in his immediate possession at all
times when operating a motor vehicle and shall, upon demand, surrender the
driver's license into the hands of a peace officer for his inspection.
4

Moreover, because the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in Mr. Anderson's
position would have felt free to ignore the request and leave, and contrary to the State's
argument (Resp.Br., p.7), Officer Herbig's testimony that he would not have "forced"
Mr. Anderson to give him the license is completely irrelevant; the statute compelled
Mr. Anderson's compliance with the officer's request. Officer Herbig's subjective intentions
have no bearing on this issue.
Next, the State's cites State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004), and United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002), for the proposition that "requesting identification does not,
without more, constitute a seizure." (See Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) However, neither case involved a
driver obligated by statute to comply with an officer's requests. In Page, the defendant was a
pedestrian, see 140 Idaho at 842; and in Drayton, the defendant was a passenger on a bus, see
536 U.S. at 201. Neither defendant had a legal duty to produce their driver's licenses in response
to the officers' requests, which distinguishes those cases from Mr. Anderson's.
Additionally, and as acknowledged by the State (Resp.Br., p.8 n.8), the Court in Page
held that, although the pedestrian was not seized as the result of an officer's request for
identification (because a reasonable pedestrian would have felt free to disregard such request),
the defendant was "seized at the point in time when Officer Marshall secured his driver's
license and ran his name through dispatch to check for outstanding warrant." Page, 140 Idaho
at 843. "[A] limited detention does occur when an officer retains a driver's license or other
paperwork of value." Id. (citing State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493 (1992), and State v.
Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 439 (Ct.App.2001) (applying the holding of Godwin to conclude that a
seizure occurred when the officer took the driver's vehicle registration)).
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Thus, there can be no serious argument that Mr. Anderson was free to ignore the officer's
request for his license and leave. 2 He was "seized" the moment the officer requested and took
his license.

2.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Showing That Mr. Anderson's Seizure
Was Reasonable Under The Fourth Amendment

The State asks this Court to hold that a seizure of a motorist is constitutionally
reasonable, even where there is no basis for suspecting that the motorist is violating the law or is
in need of assistance, so long as the encounter with the motorist was initially "consensual."
(Resp. Br., p.10.) The State relies primarily on the Idaho Supreme Court's plurality decision in
State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491 (1992), and the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in State v.
Landreth, 139 Idaho 986 (2004).

However, and contrary to the State's argument, neither

controls in Mr. Anderson's case.

a.

Godwin Does Not Control The Issue Of Reasonableness, Because It Is A
Plurality Opinion

Godwin is not controlling for several reasons.

First, Godwin is a plurality decision.

Though Godwin provides clear and controlling authority that taking a motorist's driver's license
constitutes a "seizure," see 121 Idaho at 493, there was no majority opinion as to rationale for
why the seizure in that case was constitutionally "reasonable." Only two justices agreed that the

public interest served by allowing an officer to run a license check outweighed the minimal
intrusion to a motorist when the motorist is already stopped. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 492-96
(Bakes, J., joined by Boyle, J.)

They based their opinion on two distinct rationales: (1) a

2

The State asserts that the seizure at issue was not conceded below and is therefore preserved for
appeal. (Resp. Br., p.9.) However, as accurately noted in the Appellant's Brief, the prosecutor
did concede, at least in part, the effect ofldaho Code§ 49-316. (See Appellant's Br., p.9 n.3.)
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"motorist assist" under the community caretaking function, citing State v. Ellenbecker, 159
Wis.2d 91,464 N.S.2d 427 (App.1990); and (2) an incident of a traffic stop, citing State v. Reed,
107 Idaho 172 (Ct. Appp.1984). Godwin, 121 Idaho at 492-96 (Bakes, J., joined by Boyle, J.)
("We

are

convinced

that

the

views

expressed

in

both Reed and Ellenbecker are

correct.") However, there were no facts or findings that the officer had a reasonable suspicion
that Godwin was violating any law, or was in need of assistance. 121 Idaho at 492-96. Rather,
these justices agreed that the reasonable suspicion required by Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979), was not required here, because the officers in this case had not stopped Godwin while he
was driving, his car was already stopped. Id.
The two dissenting justices opined, in a lengthy dissent, that the seizure in this case could
not be squared with the Fourth Amendment, since there was no evidence to support a reasonable
suspicion that he had violated a traffic law or was engaged in criminal activity, and no evidence
that Godwin was in need of assistance. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 457-501(Bistline, J., dissenting;
Johnson, J., concurring in dissent).
Critically, however, Justice McDevitt, casting the decisive vote to ultimately affirm,
wrote specially to concur "in the result only." Godwin, 121 Idaho at 45 (McDevitt, J.,
concurring in the result). In a separate concurring opinion, Justice McDevitt specifically
declined to accept the "motorist assist" rationale, and indicated the correct standard to apply in
this case was the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) - which is not the
standard used in the two-justice lead opinion. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 45. 3

3

Additionally, and as noted Appellant's Brief, Godwin presented unusual facts. The seizure of
Godwin was tied to the officer's valid stop of Godwin's girlfriend's vehicle, and the two were
traveling together. See 121 Idaho at 495.
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Thus, because Godwin does not provide a majority of justices agreeing on the rationale
for why the seizure was "reasonable," the rationale contained in the two-justice lead opinion is
not a "decision of the Court and is not controlling in other case." See Osick v. Public Employee

Retirement System of Idaho, 122 Idaho 457, 460 (1992); Idaho Const., Art. V, § 6.
b.

Landreth Does Not Control

Nor does the decision in Landreth control. First, to the extent that Landreth purports to
apply the controlling authority of Godwin, the Landreth Court's holdings do not have such
weight, for the reasons above. Additionally, to the extent the State reads Landreth as allowing
an officer to detain an individual, so long as the initial encounter is valid (Resp. Br., p.13-14),
such a reading cannot be reconciled with Fourth Amendment precedent. Moreover, the Landreth
court expressly warned against allowing officer-initiated license requests of motorists as
"consensual contacts," stating,
We caution that our decision does not countenance officers initiating "consensual
contacts" with individuals merely in order to follow that contact with a request for
identification to run a license or warrants check. Such law enforcement tactic
would run afoul of the Supreme Court decision in Brown [v. Texas].
139 Idaho at 991.
In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that an
officer must have "reasonable suspicion" before detaining an individual to request identification,
and that a state statute requiring the individual to produce identification upon request did not
alter that requirement.

The Landreth Court reasoned that the officer who seized Landreth

complied with Brown, because "the officer had a legitimate reason to make contact with
Landreth, even though that reason may not have justified a detention at the onset of the
encounter." 139 Idaho at 991 (emphasis added).
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Even if Landreth is read to allow for a seizure of an individual on less than reasonable
suspicion, (i.e., if the officer had a "legitimate reason" for initiating the contact), such an
understanding cannot be reconciled with the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Brown v. Texas,
which requires an officer to have "reasonable suspicion." 443 U.S. at 447.
And fmally, as argued in the Appellant's Brief, even under Landreth 's "legitimate reason
for initiating the contact" standard, the State failed meet its burden. In Landreth, the officer was
at least suspicious of criminal activity (the officer received a report of a suspicious person and he
initially suspected the theft of electricity), even if that suspicion did not rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion. 139 Idaho at 990. In Mr. Anderson's case, by contrast, Officer Herbig
failed to articulate any reason - legitimate or otherwise - for initiating the contact with
Mr. Anderson. (See Appellant's Brief, p.13.)
c.

The Rationale Of State v. Osborne Is Factually Similar And Legally
Correct

Unlike Godwin and Landreth, the case most factually similar to Mr. Anderson's seizure
is State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520 (1991). Osborne most accurately reflects the controlling
Fourth Amendment precedent. Id. In that case, officers saw Osborne standing behind a parked
truck with the truck's engine running and the driver's door open. Id. at 523. Osborne entered
the driver's side of the truck and closed the door. Id. One of the officers walked up to Osborne
and asked to see his driver's license. Id. After asking for the license, the officer detected the
smell of alcohol and had Osborne step out of the truck and ultimately arrested him for driving
under the influence of alcohol. Id. The Court of Appeals held that Osborne was "seized" when
the officer took his license, and that the seizure was unreasonable because the record was devoid
of any evidence to support an officer's reasonable suspicion, at the moment of the seizure, that
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Osborne was unlicensed or was violating of any law, and there was no basis for the officer to
exercise his community caretaking function. See 121 Idaho at 525-27.
The facts of Osborne are analogous to the present case, in that the record in this case is
undisputedly devoid of an evidentiary basis to support a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Anderson
was unlicensed or violating any law, or for the Officer to believe that Mr. Anderson was in need
of assistance.

(See generally Tr.)

The State has never asserted otherwise.

(See generally

R., Tr., Respondent's Brie£)
Also, as discussed below, Osborne is relevant in addressing the State's faulty assertion
that a motorist is entitled to less protection, under the Fourth Amendment, than a pedestrian.
(Resp. Br., pp.14-15.)

d.

Motorists, Like Pedestrians, Are Entitled To Protection Against
Suspicionless Seizures; Being Parked Does Authorize An Officer To
Conduct A Seizure

The State also argues that because Mr. Anderson "was already stopped" and was "not a
pedestrian" the officer should be allowed to take his license, even though the officer did not have
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Anderson was in violation of the law or a belief that Mr. Anderson
was in need of help. This argument is incorrect for several reasons.
First, the State's argument confuses the meaning of a "stop" in the purely physical sense,
with a "stop" in the legal sense; a stop in the legal sense is a limited detention, and it is a
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment that requires reasonable suspicion. See e.g. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ("investigatory stop" is a seizure); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.

348, 354 (2015) ("traffic stop" is a seizure). The fact that Mr. Anderson was sitting in a vehicle
that was not in motion did not authorize the officer to seize him. In Osborne, the driver was
already physically stopped, in that his truck was not moving, but he was not "seized" until the
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Officer took his license.

121 Idaho at 534. The Court held that seizure was unreasonable

because it was not supported by a reasonable suspicion. 121 Idaho at 525.
Second the fact that Mr. Anderson was a motorist and not a pedestrian only means that,
because of Idaho Code § 49-316 (1) he was required to carry driver's license, and (2) if the
officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the seizing him, such as for a traffic violation, then the
officer would be permitted to check his license as an ordinary inquiry incident to the mission of
that seizure. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. However, Officer Herbig had no reasonable suspicion
that Mr. Anderson was unlicensed or violating any other law. (See generally Tr.) Just as in
Osborne, the taking of Mr. Anderson's license violated the Fourth Amendment. Osborne, 121
Idaho at 525. As explained in Osborne, Idaho Code § 49-316 does not - and cannot because of
the Fourth Amendment's protections - permit an officer to detain the driver of a parked vehicle
without objective, reasonable suspicion:
We first consider whether the detention was justified as an appropriate licensing
check. Idaho Code § 49-316 mandates that every licensee possess a license for
driving and that the "driver shall upon demand, surrender the driver's license into
the hands of a peace officer for his inspection." However, a field officer is not
permitted to randomly stop motorist for the purpose of conducting routine license
checks. As noted by the United States Supreme Court,
To insist neither upon an appropriate factual basis for suspicion
direct at a particular auto mo bile nor upon some other substantial
and objective standard or rule to govern the exercise of discretion
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches"
The "grave danger" of abuse of discretion does not disappear
simply because the automobile is subject to state regulation
resulting in numerous instances of police contact . . . lf the
government intrudes ... the privacy interest suffers whether the
government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal
laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards.
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121 Idaho at 525 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis added by the Court of Appeals).
In Prouse, the United States Supreme Court held that the police practice of random,
suspicionless license checks violated the Fourth Amendment. 440 U.S. at 666. The Court stated
that "[a]n individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable
expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government
regulation." 440 U.S. at 662. The Court concluded that the same objective test it had established
in Terry v. Ohio standard applied to detentions of persons who are drivers and passengers of
automobiles, and held that, for an officer to seize a vehicle and its occupants, the officer is
required to have reasonable articulable suspicion. 440 U.S. at 662.
Although Prouse involved a stop of a moving vehicle and the detention of its occupants,
which may be more intrusive than detaining the passengers of the vehicle which is already
stopped, the Court of Appeals concluded the reasoning in Prouse was "equally applicable" to the
seizure of individuals in cars that are parked. 121 Idaho at 525. Quoting Prouse, the Court of
Appeals stated,
People are not shorn of all fourth amendment protections when they step from
their homes on public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they
step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.
121 at 525 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663).
Thus, contrary to the State's arguments, and as explained in Osborne, Idaho Code § 49316 does not give officers an independent basis for seizing a motorist to check his license. 121
Idaho 525. Nor could a state statute provide such an exception to the Fourth Amendment. See
Brown v. Texas, 443 US 47, 50 (1979) (holding that, a Texas statue requiring individuals to
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identify themselves to police upon request, did not alter the requirement that the requesting
officer must first have reasonable suspicion to justify detaining the individual.)
Thus, under the controlling precedent of the United States Supreme Court, an officer
must have reasonable articulable suspicion before he may detain an individual. The standard is
the same whether the individual is a pedestrian or a motorist, and the same whether the motorist
is moving or is parked. And this same standard applies, even though there is a statute that
imposes a duty on the individual who is driving to surrender his license (and be detained) upon
the request of an officer.
B.

The Exclusionary Rule Requires Suppression Because The Evidence Was Discovered As
The Result Of The Officer's Illegal Conduct And The State Has Failed To Argue, In the
District Court Or On Appeal, Any Exception To The Rule
The State has not responded to Mr. Anderson's claims that the exclusionary applies in

this case, and that the State, by failing to argue the application of any exception to the
exclusionary rule in the district court, has waived that issue on appeal. (See generally Resp. Br.)
Regarding the exclusionary rule and its application in this case, Mr. Anderson respectfully refers
this Court to his argument in the Appellant's Brief, at pages 14-16.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons and those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Anderson
respectfully asks that his Court reverse the district court's order denying suppression, vacate his
judgment of conviction, and remand his case to the district court to permit him to withdraw his
guilty plea.
DATED this 9th day of April, 2020.

I sf Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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